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Abstract
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to
provide risk-taking incentives in addition to e¤ort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-
agent model that captures the interdependence between rm risk and managerial incentives. We
calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain observed compensation
practice surprisingly well. In particular, it justies large option holdings and high base salaries.
Our analysis suggests that options should be issued in the money. If tax e¤ects are taken into
account, the model is consistent with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We
conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a major objective in executive compensation
practice.
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1 Introduction
The relation between risk and incentives is an important issue in executive compensation that is
still not fully understood. Standard agency theory puts forth the informativeness principle according
to which rms should use less incentive pay if the stock price is more volatile and therefore less
informative of the agents e¤ort. There is, however, little empirical evidence for the informativeness
principle in executive compensation.1 Another strand of the literature recognizes that the CEOs
actions a¤ect rm risk, so that incentives can have an e¤ect on risk. There is ample empirical evidence
that CEOs indeed respond to risk-taking incentives and adjust their actions accordingly.2 Also the
reaction of stock and bond prices to rst time equity grants implies that investors expect that these
grants a¤ect rm risk (see DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) and Billett, Mauer and Zhang (2006)).
What is little understood, however, is whether shareholders provide these risk-taking incentives on
purpose. Alternatively, shareholders might only be interested in e¤ort incentives, and the risk-taking
incentives documented in the literature could just be a side e¤ect of these e¤ort incentives.
We approach this question with a new calibration method that avoids the endogeneity problems
that invariably arise in regressions that include rm risk and managerial incentives. Instead we model
the endogeneity between risk and incentives and test the implications of the model. We develop a
stylized principal-agent model from standard building blocks where an e¤ort-averse and risk-averse
agent chooses his e¤ort and the rms strategy, and where the strategy a¤ects rm value and risk.
This model incorporates not only the notion that the CEOs actions a¤ect rm risk and rm value,
but also the informativeness principle that higher rm risk makes the stock price less informative
and weakens e¤ort incentives. We calibrate this model to the data on 737 U.S. CEOs and for each
generate predictions about the optimal compensation structure, i.e. the optimal mix of base salary,
stock, and options, and the optimal strike price. We then compare these predictions with observed
data and nd that our model can explain observed compensation structures - and in particular the
pervasive use of stock options - much better than models that do not take into account risk-taking
incentives. We therefore conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a major objective in
executive compensation practice.
1Prendergast (2002) provides a brief survey of the empirical evidence for the informativeness principle in executive
compensation. Three of the eleven papers included in the survey nd a signicant negative relationship between risk and
incentives. Three other papers nd a signicant positive relationship, and the remaining ve papers nd no signicant
relationship.
2Tufano (1996) and Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) show this for hedging decisions, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002)
for investment decisions, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2007) for capital structure
decisions, and May (1995), Smith and Swan (2007), and Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2008) for corporate acquisitions.
Low (2009) analyzes changes in rm risk after a change in takeover legislation.
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In our model, CEOs are poorly diversied because a large part of their wealth is linked to the
companys share price to provide e¤ort incentives. In the absence of proper risk-taking incentives,
CEOs therefore prefer low rm risk and tend to choose a rm strategy that results in ine¢ ciently low
risk. They might, for instance, pass up a protable but very risky project, or they might hedge their
rms risk at some cost. Shareholders can reduce this ine¢ ciency by providing risk-taking incentives.
The challenge is to provide risk-taking incentives without impairing e¤ort incentives. While high
stock price realizations are an unmistakably good signal, low stock price realizations are ambiguous:
they can be indicative of low e¤ort (which is bad) or of extensive risk-taking (which is good, given
that the CEO leans towards ine¢ ciently low risk). The best way to provide e¤ort and risk-taking
incentives therefore is to reward good outcomes and not to punish bad ones, i.e. the optimal contract
resembles a call option on the rms stock.
In line with this intuition, our calibrations predict contracts with large option holdings and
little or no stock. The optimal strike price is lower than the observed strike price which indicates
that options should be issued in the money according to the model. In-the-money options provide
incentives for intermediate and high outcomes and they avoid punishing the CEO for bad outcomes.
Hence they provide e¤ort and risk-taking incentives at the same time. Our model also predicts higher
base salaries than observed, because these must rise as stock is replaced by less valuable options to
guarantee the CEOs reservation utility. The savings that can be expected when rms switch from
the observed contract to the optimal contract are low and average only 5.3% of total compensation
costs.
In an otherwise similar model without risk-taking incentives, Dittmann and Maug (2007) nd
optimal contracts that save 54% of compensation costs. These contracts involve negative option
holdings, much higher stock holdings, and negative salaries, i.e. CEOs are required to invest a
sizeable proportion of their wealth into their own rm. Even if alternative preference specications
are taken into account, at least 26% of the CEOs should have negative option holdings or negative
xed salaries (see Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2009)). Hence, risk-taking incentives can rationalize
why the vast majority of CEOs receive positive salaries and option grants, whereas e¤ort-incentives
alone cannot explain this stylized fact. We conclude from this comparison that risk-taking incentives
play an important role in executive compensation practice.
The U.S. tax system strongly discriminates against in-the-money options.3 In our calibrations,
3According to IRC Section 162(m), in-the-money stock options are not considered as performance-based compen-
sation, so that the "one-million-dollar" rule applies and only up to $1m (including base salary) are deductible on
corporate tax returns. Moreover, Section 409A requires that the di¤erence between the stock price and the strike price
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the savings from recontracting are much smaller than the additional tax penalties most rms and
executives would have to pay if in-the-money options were used. If we include these tax penalties
in our model, observed contracts turn out to be optimal for 76% to 94% of all CEOs in our sample
(depending on assumptions), so our model is broadly consistent with compensation practice. In this
context, our analysis suggests that the current U.S. tax system forces rms to resort to ine¢ cient
contract arrangements, because most rms - and especially small rms with poor past performance -
could benet from granting in-the-money options. Moreover, our analysis shows that the universal use
of at-the-money options, that is often seen as evidence for managerial rent-extraction (see Bebchuk
and Fried (2004)), is perfectly consistent with e¢ cient contracting.
Our calibration approach bridges the gap between theoretical and empirical research on execu-
tive compensation. It permits us to test the quantitative (and not just the qualitative) implications
of our model, and it generates a price tag for any deviation from optimality. Moreover, this approach
circumvents the endogeneity problem that shareholders simultaneously determine rm risk and man-
agerial incentives when they design the compensation contract. We model this endogeneity and test
the predictions of the model. Our evidence is indirect, but it is free of any endogeneity bias.
Our analysis also gives rise to a new measure of risk-taking incentives. Most researchers use
the vega of the managers portfolio, i.e. its sensitivity to a change in stock return volatility. Our
model suggests that the ratio of vega to delta (the sensitivity to a change in stock price) is a superior
measure. This measure takes into account not only the direct e¤ect of an increase of volatility on
the managers wealth (which is vega), but also the indirect e¤ect that higher volatility is associated
with a higher stock price. An increase in stock price then feeds through to managerial wealth via
the managers incentive pay, i.e. delta.4
We also contribute to the discussion on whether executive stock options do provide risk-taking
incentives. Intuitively, this seems obvious as the value of an option increases with the volatility of
the underlying asset (see, e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981) or Smith and Stulz (1985)). However,
Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and Lewellen (2006) argue that stock options can make managers
more averse to increases in rm risk, so that stock options might be counter-productive if risk-
be recognized as income at the time of vesting, rather than on exercise. Thus this rule accelerates income recognition
from the exercise date to the vesting date. In addition, Section 409A imposes an additional 20% tax on this income
(see Alexander, Hirschey, and Scholz (2007)).
4 In the second-best optimum, the CEOs utility decreases in rm risk, so that he takes ine¢ ciently low risk (relative
to the rst-best optimum). If the CEO takes on more risk in this situation, rm value increases. The utility-adjusted
vega is negative, so that the ratio of vega to delta increases in vega and in delta. On the other hand, if risk-taking
incentives are so high that the CEOs utility increases in risk, vega is positive and the ratio of vega to delta increases
in vega and decreases in delta. In this situation, the CEO takes ine¢ ciently high risk. As risk-taking incentives are
costly, this latter situation will never be an equilibrium in our model.
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taking incentives need to be provided. Our paper shows that options are indeed part of an optimal
contract. They can be detrimental to risk-taking incentives, but wreak less havoc than stock. Having
neither stock nor options is not an alternative, because such a contract would not provide any e¤ort
incentives.
There are a few theory papers that also consider both e¤ort-aversion and risk-taking incentives
in models of executive compensation.5 To our knowledge, this paper is the rst, however, to calibrate
such a model and to test its quantitative implications. While we attribute the existence of options
to the provision of risk-taking incentives in this paper, we acknowledge that there are alternative
explanations for the use of options in executive compensation.6 We also contribute to recent literature
on calibrations of contracting models by considering a richer and more realistic model than previous
papers.7
In the next section, we present our model in which the manager must choose e¤ort and the rms
strategy. We derive the appropriate measure of risk-taking incentives in Section 2.2 and explain our
calibration approach in Section 2.3. In a nutshell, we numerically search for the cheapest contract
with a given shape that provides the manager with the same incentives and the same utility as the
observed contract. Section 2.4 discusses the construction of our data set. In Section 3, we present
our main results on optimal piecewise linear contracts consisting of base salary, stock, and an option
grant. Section 4 discusses reasons why in-the-money options are rarely used in practice. In particular,
we analyze the impact of U.S. taxes on our calibration results here. In order to better understand
our results for piecewise linear contracts, we then theoretically derive the unrestricted shape of the
optimal contract in Section 5 and calibrate this shape to the data. Section 6 contains robustness
5Lambert (1986) and Core and Qian (2002) consider discrete volatility choices, where the agent must exert e¤ort in
order to gather information about the investment projects. Feltham and Wu (2001) and Lambert and Larcker (2004)
assume that the agents choice of e¤ort simultaneously a¤ects mean and variance of the rm value distribution, so
they reduce the two-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional problem. Two other papers (and our model) work with
continuous e¤ort and volatility choice: Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) analyze a rather stylized principal-agent model and
solve it for special cases. Flor, Frimor and Munk (2006) consider a similar model to ours but they work with the
assumption that stock prices are normally distributed while we work with the lognormal distribution. Hellwig (2008)
and Sung (1995) solve models with continuous e¤ort and volatility choice, but Hellwig (2008) assumes that the agent
is risk-neutral and Sung (1995) that the principal can observe (and e¤ectively set) volatility.
6Oyer (2004) models options as a device to retain employees when recontracting is expensive, and Inderst and Müller
(2005) explain options as instruments that provide outside shareholders with better liquidation incentives. Edmans and
Gabaix (2009) and Edmans et al. (2009) show that convex contracts can arise in dynamic contracting models. Peng
and Röell (2009) analyze stock price manipulations in a model with multiplicative CEO preferences and nd convex
contracts for some parameterizations. Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (1999) assume gamma distributed stock prices
and nd convex contracts, but Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that these results are not robust. Dittmann, Maug and
Spalt (2009) show that options can be explained if managers are loss-averse. With the exception of Dittmann, Maug
and Spalt (2009), none of these models has been calibrated to data, and some models are too stylized to be calibrated
at all.
7See Dittmann and Maug (2007), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2008), and Dittmann,
Maug, and Spalt (2009).
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checks, and Section 7 concludes. The appendix explores the validity of the rst-order approach and
contains the proofs.
2 The model and its calibration
2.1 Model
We consider two points in time. At time t = 0 the contract between a risk-neutral principal (the
shareholders) and a risk-averse agent (CEO) is signed, and at time t = T the contract period
ends. The market value of the rm at time t = 0 (after the contract details have been disclosed)
is P0 = E(PT ) expf rfTg, where rf is the appropriate rate of return. At some point during the
contract period (0; T ), the agent makes two choices. First, he chooses e¤ort e 2 [0;1) that results in
private costs C(e) to the agent and that a¤ects the rms expected value E(PT ). Second, he chooses
a strategy s that a¤ects the rms expected value E(PT ) and the rms stock return volatility . We
will refer to  interchangeably as rm risk. We can therefore write E(PT ) = P0(e; s) expfrfTg and
 = (s).8
We think of the strategy s as a feasible combination of many di¤erent actions that a¤ect, among
other things, project choice, mergers and acquisitions, capital structure, or nancial transactions.
Part of the strategy could be, for instance, an R&D project that increases value and risk. Another
part could be nancial hedging of some input factor which would reduce value and risk, etc. Due to
its richness, we do not model the agents choice of strategy in detail. Instead we recognize that a
risk-averse agent with a wage contract w(PT ) that is increasing in PT will always choose an action
that minimizes rm risk  given expected value E(PT ), or equivalently that maximizes expected value
E(PT ) given risk . Let es(e; ) denote the strategy that maximizes expected value E(PT ) given e¤ort
e and volatility . Then the agents choice of e¤ort e and strategy s is equivalent to a choice of e¤ort
e and volatility : E(PT ) = P0(e; es(e; )) expfrfTg = P0(e; ) expfrfTg: In the remainder of this
paper, we therefore work with the reduced form of our model where the agent chooses e¤ort e and
volatility .
We assume that there is a rst-best rm strategy s(e) that maximizes rm value (given e¤ort
e). Let (e) := (s(e)) denote the rm risk that is associated with this strategy. If the agent wants
to reduce risk to some value below (e), he can do so in two ways. Either he drops some risky but
8 In our model, e¤ort only a¤ects expected value but not rm risk whereas strategy a¤ects both value and risk.
Other models (e.g. Feltham and Wu, 2001) assume that the agent only chooses e¤ort and that e¤ort a¤ects value and
risk. The main di¤erence between Feltham and Wu (2001) and our model in this respect is that our model allows the
CEO to a¤ect value and risk independently of each other.
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protable projects (e.g. an R&D project), or he takes an additional action that reduces risk but also
prots (e.g. costly hedging). In both cases, a reduction in volatility  leads to a reduction in rm
value E(PT ). We therefore assume that P0(e; ) is increasing and concave in  as long as  < (e).
In the region above (e), rm value P0(e; ) is weakly decreasing: if the agent can costlessly take
on more risk in nancial markets, it is at; otherwise, a higher value of  also leads to a distortion
of the agents actions and thereby to a lower rm value. Finally, we assume that the stock price
P0(e; ) is increasing and concave in e (given volatility ).
Our model is in the spirit of Holmström (1979): The principal cannot observe the agents actions
e and , so the managers wage WT only depends on the end-or-period stock price PT .9 We use risk-
neutral pricing and assume that the end-of-period stock price PT is lognormally distributed:
PT (u; e; ) = P0 (e; ) exp

rf   
2
2

T + u
p
T

; u  N (0; 1) : (1)
Here, rf is the risk-free rate, and P0(e; ) = E(PT (u; e; )) expf rfTg is the expected present value
of the end-of-period stock price PT .10
The managers utility is additively separable in wealth and e¤ort and has constant relative risk
aversion with parameter  with respect to wealth:
U (WT ; e) = V (WT )  C (e) = W
1 
T
1     C (e) : (2)
If  = 1, we dene V (WT ) = ln(WT ). Costs of e¤ort are assumed to be increasing and convex in
e¤ort, i.e. C 0(e) > 0 and C 00(e) > 0. There is no direct cost associated with the managers choice of
volatility. Volatility  a¤ects the managers utility indirectly via the stock price distribution and the
utility function V (:). Finally, we assume that the manager has outside employment opportunities
9The ex-post volatility can obviously be estimated from stock returns, but these are only realizations of the ex-
ante distribution whose volatility the CEO selects. Moreover, volatility is not exclusively determined by the CEOs
management strategy. If the CEO has other means to drive up volatility (e.g. by frequent contradictory announcements),
total observed volatility can be manipulated and can be higher than the fundamental volatility the CEO selects in our
model.
10Risk-neutral pricing allows us to abstract from the agents portfolio problem, because in our model the only
alternative to an investment in the own rm is an investment at the risk-free rate. If we allowed the agent to earn a
risk-premium on the shares of his rm, he could value these above their actual market price, because investing into his
own rm is then the only way to earn the risk-premium. Our assumption e¤ectively means that all risk in the model
is rm-specic.
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that give him expected utility U . The shareholdersoptimization problem then is:
max
WT ;e;
E [PT  WT (PT )je; ] (3)
subject to E [V (WT (PT ))je; ]  C(e)  U (4)
and fe; g 2 argmax fE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]  C(e)g (5)
We replace the incentive compatibility constraint (5) with its rst-order conditions:
dE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]
de
  dC
de
= 0 (6)
dE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]
d
= 0; (7)
We discuss the validity of the rst-order approach (i.e. that (5) can indeed be replaced by (6) and (7))
in detail in Appendix A. We call condition (6) the e¤ort incentive constraint and (7) the volatility
incentive constraint.
2.2 Measuring risk-taking incentives
In the empirical literature on executive compensation, risk-taking incentives are usually measured
by the vega of the managers equity portfolio, i.e. by the partial derivative of the managers wealth
with respect to his own rms stock return volatility.11 An exception are Lambert, Larcker and
Verrecchia (1991) who work with what we call the "utility adjusted vega", i.e. the partial derivative
of the managers expected utility with respect to stock return volatility. However, there is another
e¤ect of volatility on managerial utility that - to the best of our knowledge - has been ignored in
empirical literature on risk-taking incentives: higher volatility leads to higher rm value (as more
valuable risky projects are adopted) and via the pay-for-performance sensitivity (the delta of the
managers equity portfolio) to higher managerial utility. Consequently, there are two ways to provide
risk-taking incentives: increasing (utility adjusted) vega or increasing (utility adjusted) delta. In this
subsection, we derive this result formally from our model and propose a new measure of risk-taking
incentives that combines the two e¤ects.
In our model, risk-taking incentives are described in the volatility incentive constraint (7). This
11See, among others, Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002), Habib and
Ljungqvist (2005), and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006).
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constraint can be rewritten as
E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dPT
dPT
d
 e;  = 0 (8)
Substituting in the derivative of the stock price PT with respect to volatility  from (1) yields
, E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dPT

dP0
d
PT
P0
+ PT

 T + u
p
T
 e;  = 0: (9)
As dP0=d is not random, we can rearrange (9) as
PPSua
dP0
d
=  ua; (10)
where PPSua := E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dP0
 e;  = E  dV (WT )dWT dWTdPT PTP0
 e;  (11)
and ua := E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dPT
PT

 T + u
p
T
 e;  : (12)
Here, PPSua is the utility adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity, or the utility adjusted delta,
which measures how much the managers expected utility rises for a marginal stock price increase.
Likewise, ua is the utility adjusted vega, i.e. the marginal increase in the managers expected utility
for a marginal increase in volatility - assuming that rm value P0 stays constant.
The rst order condition (10) equals marginal benets to marginal costs of an increase in volatil-
ity from the agents point of view. The benets stem from an increase in rm value dP0=d in which
the manager participates via his incentive pay PPSua. The costs are given by the decrease of the
managers utility  ua due to higher volatility. Rewriting the rst order condition (10) yields our
proposed measure for total risk-taking incentives:
RTI :=
ua
PPSua
=  dP0
d
(13)
RTI is indeed a measure of risk-taking incentives: a manager with higher RTI will choose higher
volatility , because P0() is concave and dRTI=d > 0. The rst-best solution is RTI = 0. Then the
manager is indi¤erent to rm risk and will choose the optimal rm strategy. If RTI < 0, risk-taking
incentives are ine¢ ciently low (relative to the rst-best solution); if RTI > 0, they are ine¢ ciently
high. Thus while risk-taking incentives always increase in vega ua, they increase in PPSua only if
RTI < 0.
With a risk-averse manager, the second-best RTI will always be negative. Risk-taking incentives
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increase the uncertainty of the agents payo¤ and are therefore costly. Consequently, the rm will
increase risk-taking incentives only up to the point where the marginal costs of additional incentives
are equal to the marginal benet of an increase in rm risk. In this second-best situation, RTI
increases in vega ua and in the pay-for-performance sensitivity PPSua. Stock grants have a positive
e¤ect on PPSua and a negative e¤ect on ua, and the combined e¤ect on RTI is negative. The same
is true for options as long as their strike price is low (see Ross, 2004).
2.3 Calibration method
We cannot calibrate the full optimization problem to the data, because this requires knowledge (or
estimates) of the production function P0(e; ) and of the cost function C(e). We therefore resort to
the subproblem of nding a new contract with a given shape that achieves three objectives. Firstly it
provides the same e¤ort and risk-taking incentives to the agent as the observed contract. Secondly it
provides the agent with the same utility as the observed contract, and thirdly it is as cheap as possible
for the rm. This subproblem is the rst stage of the two-stage procedure in Grossman and Hart
(1983), where they search for the cheapest contract that implements a given level of e¤ort. In our
case, this is the level of e¤ort that is implemented by the observed contract. If our model is correct
and descriptive of the data, the cheapest contract found in this optimization will be identical to the
observed contract. If the new contract di¤ers substantially, the observed contract is not e¢ cient
according to the model: it is possible to nd a cheaper contract that implements the same e¤ort and
the same investment choices as the observed contract. In this case, either compensation practice is
ine¢ cient or the model is incorrect. In both cases, the model is not descriptive of the data.
We only calculate the cost-e¤ective contract for the e¤ort/volatility level implemented by the
observed contract. We cannot repeat this task for alternative e¤ort/volatility levels, because this
would require knowledge of the production and the cost function. Therefore we cannot analyze the
optimal level of e¤ort or volatility (i.e., the second stage in Grossman and Hart (1983)). Our method
analyzes the optimal structure of compensation only.
We start by rewriting the e¤ort incentive constraint (6) so that the LHS of the equation does not
contain any quantities that we cannot compute while the RHS does not contain the wage function
(see Jenter (2002)):
PPSua(WT (PT ); e; ; ) = E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dP0
 e;  = C 0(e)dP0
de
(14)
Under the null hypothesis that the model is correct, the observed contract fullls this equation, so
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that the e¤ort incentive constraint in our calibration problem becomes:
PPSua(W T (PT ); e; ; ) = PPS
ua(W dT (PT ); e; ; ) (15)
Here W T denotes the new (cost minimizing) contract and W
d
T denotes the observed contract (d for
"data").
We can reformulate the participation constraint (4) and the volatility incentive constraint (7) in
a similar way:
E [V (W T (PT ))je; ; ]  E
h
V (W dT (PT ))je; ; 
i
; (16)
RTI(W T (PT ); e; ; ) = RTI(W
d
T (PT ); e; ; ): (17)
For our calibration approach to work, we also need to restrict the shape of the optimal contract,
so that it depends on only a few parameters. In Section 5, we derive the optimal contract shape which
depends on three parameters and we calibrate this to the data. In the next section, we calibrate a
piecewise linear contract that consists of xed salary , the number of shares nS , and the number
of options nO with strike price K:
W linT (PT ) = (W0 + ) expfrfTg+ nSPT + nOmaxfPT  K; 0g: (18)
With W0 we denote the managers initial non-rm wealth, i.e. all wealth that is not invested in stock
or options of his own rm. We express the number of shares nS and the number of options nO as
a percentage of outstanding shares, so that 0  nS  1. Our numerical optimization problem is to
minimize the costs of the new contract, E
 
W linT (PT )jed; d

, subject to the constraints (15), (16),
and (17). We have four parameters to minimize costs over: , nS , nO, and K.
2.4 Data set
We use the ExecuComp database to construct approximate CEO contracts at the beginning of the
2006 scal year. We rst identify all persons in the database who were CEO during the full year
2006 and executive of the same company in 2005. We calculate the base salary  (which is the sum
of salary, bonus, and "other compensation" from ExecuComp) from 2006 data, and take information
on stock and option holdings from the end of the 2005 scal year. We subsume bonus payments
under base salary, because previous research has shown that bonus payments are only weakly related
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to rm performance (see Hall and Liebman (1998)).12
We estimate each CEOs option portfolio with the method proposed by Core and Guay (2002)
and then aggregate this portfolio into one representative option. This aggregation is necessary to
arrive at a parsimonious wage function (in fact at (18)) that can be calibrated to the data. Our
model is static and therefore cannot accommodate option grants with di¤erent maturities. The
representative option is determined so that it has a similar e¤ect as the actual option portfolio on
the agents utility, his e¤ort incentives, and his risk-taking incentives. More precisely, we numerically
calculate the number of options nO, the strike price K, and the maturity T so that the representative
option has the same Black-Scholes value, the same option delta, and the same option vega as the
estimated option portfolio.13 In this step, we lose ve CEOs for whom we cannot numerically solve
this system of three equations in three unknowns.
We take the rms market capitalization P0 from the end of 2005. While our formulae above
abstract from dividend payments for the sake of simplicity, we take dividends into account in our
empirical work and use the dividend rate d from 2005. We estimate the rms stock return volatility
 from daily CRSP stock returns over the scal year 2006 and drop all rms with fewer than 220
daily stock returns on CRSP. We use the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database to link ExecuComp
with CRSP data. The risk-free rate is set to the U.S. government bond yield with ve-year maturity
from January 2006.
We estimate the non-rm wealth W0 of each CEO from the ExecuComp database by assuming
that all historic cash inows from salary and the sale of shares minus the costs of exercising options
have been accumulated and invested year after year at the one-year risk-free rate. We assume that
the CEO had zero wealth when he entered the database (which biases our estimate downward) and
that he did not consume since then (which biases our estimate upward). To arrive at meaningful
wealth estimates, we discard all CEOs who do not have a history of at least ve years (from 2001 to
2005) on ExecuComp. During this period, they need not be CEO. This procedure results in a data
set with 737 CEOs.
[Insert Table 1 here]
12We do not take into account pension benets, because they are di¢ cult to compile and because there is no role
for pensions in a one-period model. Pensions can be regarded as negative risk-taking incentives (see Sundaram and
Yermack (2007) and Edmans (2007)), so that we overestimate risk-taking incentives in observed contracts.
13We take into account the fact that most CEOs exercise their stock options before maturity by multiplying the
maturities of the individual option grants by 0.7 before calculating the representative option (see Huddart and Lang
(1996) and Carpenter (1998)). In these calculations, we use the stock return volatility from ExecuComp and, for the
risk-free rate, the U.S. government bond yield with 5-year maturity from January 2006. Data on risk-free rates have
been obtained from the Federal Reserve Boards website. For CEOs who do not have any options, we set K = P0 and
T = 10 as these are typical values for newly granted options.
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Table 1 Panel A provides an overview of our data set. The median CEO owns 0.3% of the
stock of his company and has options on an additional 1% of the companys stock. The median base
salary is $1.1m, and the median non-rm wealth is $11.1m. The representative option has a median
maturity of ve years and is well in the money with a moneyness (K=P0) of 72%. Most stock options
are granted at the money in the United States (see Murphy (1999)), but after a few years they are
likely to be in the money. This is the reason why the representative option grant is in the money for
90% of the CEOs in our sample. In the interest of readability, we call an option with a strike price
K that is close to the observed strike price Kd an "at-the-money option". Consequently, we call an
option grant "in-the-money" only if its strike price K is lower than the observed strike price Kd.
We require that all CEOs in our data set are included in the ExecuComp database for the years
2001 to 2006, and this requirement is likely to bias our data set towards surviving CEOs, namely
those who are older and richer and who work in bigger and more successful rms. Table 1 Panel B
describes the full ExecuComp universe of CEOs in 2006. Compared to this larger sample, our CEOs
are, on average, one year older and own somewhat more options (+0:1%). They work in bigger
rms (+$500m) with better past performance (1:25% higher return during the past ve years). We
conclude that our sample is subject to a moderate survivorship bias. We investigate this bias by
separately analyzing subsamples with more successful and less successful CEOs in Section 6.
The only parameter in our model that we cannot estimate from the data is the managers
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion . We therefore repeat our analysis for six di¤erent risk-aversion
parameters ranging from  = 0:5 (low risk-aversion) to  = 8 (strong risk-aversion). This range
includes the risk-aversion parameters used in previous research. We regard values of  below 1 as
unrealistically low as they imply implausible private portfolio decisions: with  < 1, the CEO would
like to borrow heavily and invest much more than his entire wealth in the stock market.
3 Optimal piecewise linear contracts
In this section we present our main empirical results. For each CEO in our sample, we numerically
calculate the cheapest piecewise linear contract that provides the manager with the same utility and
the same incentives as the observed contract. We call this cheaper contract the "optimal contract"
and compare it with the observed contract.
More formally, we minimize E
 
W linT (PT )

subject to the participation constraint (16) and the
two incentive compatibility constraints (15) and (17). We need a few additional restrictions, so that
the problem is well-dened. First, we assume that the number of shares nS is non-negative. We allow
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for negative option holdings nO and negative salaries , but we require that nO >  nS expfdTg and
 >  W0 to prevent negative payouts. Negative option holdings or negative salaries are rarely seen
in practice, but they are certainly possible. A negative salary would imply that the rm requires the
CEO to invest this amount of his private wealth in rm equity. We argue that a good model should
not assume but rather generate positive option holdings and positive salaries.14
We also need to restrict the strike price K, because options and shares become indistinguishable
if K approaches zero, and the problem becomes poorly identied if K is small. We work with two
lower bounds for K. We rst solve the numerical problem with the restriction K=P0  20%. If we
nd a corner solution with K=P0 = 20%, we repeat the calibration with a lower bound K=P0  10%.
If the second calibration does not converge, we use the (corner) solution from the rst step.15
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2, Panel A contains our calibration results for six values of the risk-aversion parameter ,
ranging from 0.5 to 8. For low values of risk-aversion we lose some of our 737 observations, because
risk-taking incentives from (13) are positive.16 The column Observations displays the remaining
observations after CEOs with positive ua have been deleted, and the column Converged shows the
number of CEOs for which our numerical routine was successful. In addition, the table describes the
four contract parameters , nS , nO, and K of the calibrated optimal contract, and the percentage
savings the rm could realize by switching from the observed contract W dT to the optimal contract
W T , i.e.
savings =
h
E

W dT (PT )

  E (W T (PT ))
i
=E

W dT (PT )

: (19)
Optimal contracts di¤er systematically from observed contracts regarding the CEOs stock hold-
ings. While observed contracts nearly always contain stock holdings, 99% of all CEOs would not
receive any shares according to the optimal contract for  = 3. Instead, the strike price of their
option holdings would be much lower: the median strike price is 51% of the share price compared to
14We do not allow for negative stockholdings, because compensation could then become non-monotonic in stock price.
We discuss non-monotonic contracts in Section 5 and Appendix A.
15 In many cases, the objective function in our problem is rather at around the optimal solution. In order to check
whether an interior solution with nS > 0 is indeed the optimal solution (in most cases we nd n

S = 0, as we discuss
shortly), we repeat our calibration with the additional restriction nS = 0 whenever we obtain a solution with nS > 0 in
the original problem. In almost all cases, the contract with nS = 0 is slightly cheaper than the initially found contract
with nS > 0. This shows that interior solutions with n

S > 0 are a numerical artifact. For our empirical analysis we
always use the solution with the lowest costs.
16As long as the agent is risk-averse, our model predicts negative RTI in equilibrium (see the discussion at the end
of Section 2.2). Therefore, a positive RTI directly rejects our model assumptions. We interpret the fact that RTI > 0
for many CEOs for   1 as a conrmation that these levels of risk-aversion are unrealistically low. Note that, for the
more reasonable value  = 3, virtually all the CEOs in our sample have negative RTI.
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Figure 1: The gure shows end-of-period wealth WT as a function of end-of-period stock price PT
for the observed contract (solid line) and the optimal piecewise linear contract (dashed line) for one
CEO in our sample. The arrows indicate the three main features of the optimal contract relative to
the observed contract: (1) it punishes very bad outcomes less, (2) it rewards very good outcomes less,
and (3) the strike price of the option grant is lower. The parameters for this CEO are  = $6:3m,
nS = 5:97%, nO = 4:45% for the observed contract. Initial non-rm wealth is W0 = $30:3m.
P0 = $853m,  = 25:6%, and K=P0 = 90%, T = 4:9 years, rf = 4:4%, d = 0:9%. All calculations are
for  = 3.
72% for the observed contract. While average and median option holdings are higher for the optimal
contract with  = 3, this is not uniformly so for all CEOs. Instead, we nd that the sum of stock
and options is always smaller in the optimal contract than in the observed contract (not shown in
the table). Therefore, the optimal contract is less steep than the observed contract in the best states
of the world.
The general picture is that the stock and option holdings in the observed contract are replaced
by option holdings that are considerably deeper in the money. As options are less valuable than
shares, this exchange is accompanied by an increase in base salary, so that the new contract provides
the same expected utility to the agent as the observed contract. The model predicts that median base
salaries (for  = 3) should nearly triple from $1.1m to $3.2m. For   1, optimal base salaries and
option holdings are virtually always positive. Hence, a model with e¤ort and risk-taking incentives
can explain these stylized facts far better than models that account for e¤ort incentives only. In those
models, at least 25% of the CEOs should receive no options or a negative xed salary (see Dittmann
and Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2009)).
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Figure 1 illustrates our main results. It shows the payout function WT (PT ) of the observed
contract and the optimal contract for one CEO in our sample. This CEO is not representative for
our sample; for a typical CEO the two contracts are more di¢ cult to distinguish visually. The three
arrows in Figure 1 indicate the main features of the optimal contract and help to develop an intuition
for our main result that in-the-money options are a cheaper way to provide incentives than a portfolio
of stock and at-the-money options. The rst feature of the optimal contract is that it provides for
less punishment in the bad states of the world than the observed contract, which improves risk-taking
incentives. On the other hand, the optimal contract also gives fewer rewards in the best states of
the world (feature 2), which reduces risk-taking incentives. These two e¤ects o¤set each other, so
that the optimal contract provides the same risk-taking incentives as the observed contract. E¤ort
incentives, on the other hand, are reduced by both features (1) and (2). Moving the strike price more
into the money (feature 3), however, increases e¤ort incentives and o¤sets the e¤ect of features (1)
and (2). Therefore, the optimal contract also generates the same e¤ort incentives as the observed
contract; it merely moves some of the e¤ort incentives from the tails of the distribution to its center.
Finally observe that features (1) and (2) make the optimal contract less risky than the observed
contract. Therefore the agent demands a lower risk-premium for the optimal contract than for the
observed contract, and the optimal contract is cheaper for shareholders.
However, the savings generated by switching to the optimal contract are limited. For  = 3, the
median rm would just save 2:6% of its compensation costs (the average is 5:3%, see Table 2, Panel
A). The savings in the case shown in Figure 1 are 2:8%. This is hardly a savings potential that would
trigger shareholder activism or takeovers. The comparatively small savings imply that a portfolio of
stock and at-the-money options is a good substitute for in-the-money options. The numerical ip
side of low savings is that the objective function (after taking into account the constraints) is rather
at. While this is certainly a complication when it comes to solving the model numerically (see
Footnote 15), it is not a problem of our model but rather a result.
While 98:8% of the CEOs in our sample would not receive any stock if rms implemented the
optimal contract, there are still 1:2% who would. A more detailed analysis (not shown in the tables)
shows that there are two reasons for these positive stockholdings. A few CEOs have no options in
their observed contract, so that it is not possible to construct an alternative contract with all the
three features highlighted in Figure 1. For other CEOs, our optimization routine hits the boundary
K=P0 = 20% or K=P0 = 10% , so that we have a corner solution with positive stock holdings. Beyond
these two cases, we nd no true interior solutions with nS > 0, except for  = 0:5. We therefore
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conclude that, within our model, in-the-money options are generally preferable to a portfolio of
at-the-money options and stock.
Table 2, Panel B reproduces the results from Panel A for those 282 CEOs for which our algorithm
converges for all   1. This table shows that, as  increases, the optimal contract features fewer
stock options, lower strike prices, and lower base salaries. Therefore, the contract becomes atter
and less convex as  increases. Savings are considerable for high levels of risk-aversion and negligible
for  = 1. This nding is not surprising as savings stem from improved risk-sharing, which is more
important if CEOs are more risk-averse.
4 Taxes and the popularity of at-the-money options
The low savings from recontracting shown in Table 2 imply that observed compensation practice
is consistent with our model if there is an e¤ect (possibly even small) in favor of shareholdings or
at-the-money options that we did not account for in our model. In this section, we review a few
potential reasons why at-the-money options are so popular in compensation practice.
The U.S. tax system strongly discriminates against in-the-money options (see Footnote 3). Ac-
cording to IRC Section 409A, income from in-the-money options is subject to a 20% penalty tax
that has to be paid by the executive at the time of vesting. Shares, at-the-money options, or out-
of-the-money options are not subject to this additional tax. Walker (2009) argues that this rule
"is probably the measure that most strongly discourages explicit grants of in-the-money options."
Moreover, in-the-money options (like restricted stock) do not automatically qualify as performance
based pay under IRC Section 162(m) and therefore count towards the $1 million per executive that
are tax deductible at rm level. However, this rule can be easily circumvented by subjecting in-the-
money options to specic performance criteria. We therefore concentrate on the 20% penalty tax
from Section 409A and neglect the potential e¤ects of Section 162(m) in the following analysis.17
To illustrate the e¤ect of taxes, we rst consider a representative CEO whose parameters are
closest to the median values shown in Table 1.18 The observed contract of this representative CEO
consists of $1.1m base salary, $7.9m stock, and at-the-money options with a Black-Scholes value of
17Another potential reason why we do not see in-the-money options in the U.S. are the U.S. accounting rules. In-
the-money options always had to be expensed while at-the-money options did not need to be expensed prior to 2006.
These accounting reasons probably explain the absence of in-the-money options before 2004, the year in which Section
409A was enacted.
18For each parameter (observed salary d, observed stock holdings ndS , observed option holdings n
d
O, wealth W0, rm
size P0, stock return volatility , time to maturity T , and moneyness K=P0) and each CEO we calculate the absolute
percentage di¤erence between individual and median value. Then we calculate the maximum relative di¤erence for
each CEO and select the CEO for whom this maximum di¤erence is smallest.
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$12.1m. Our model proposes instead $3.9m base salary, no stock, and in-the-money options with a
value of $17.0m. This contract would generate savings of $0.2m or 1% of total compensation costs,
but the CEO would have to pay additional taxes of $3.4m (= 20%  $17m) in expectation, so that a
portfolio of stock and at-the-money options is cheaper than in-the-money options if taxes are taken
into account.
In order to investigate this tax e¤ect more systematically, we repeat our numerical analysis for
 = 3 with the 20% tax penalty on in-the-money options. We assume that this tax must be paid
if and only if the strike price is lower than the observed strike price, so we e¤ectively assume that
all options in the observed contract have been issued at-the-money. We nd that in this setting the
observed contract turns out to be optimal for 93:7% of all CEOs for whom our algorithm converges
(not shown in the tables).
This tax analysis does not take into account that part of the shares held by an executive might
not be restricted but held voluntarily. If these are replaced by in-the-money options, the executive
would have to sell them and buy in-the-money options from the proceeds. As these options are bought
from private wealth, they would not be subject to the 20% penalty tax.19 In the above example, all
the shares held by the representative CEO are unrestricted. If he sells them and invests the proceeds
of $7:9m into options, only $9:1m (= $17m  $7:9m) are subject to the penalty tax, resulting in a
penalty of $1:82m which still exceeds the benets from recontracting ($0:2m). For the full sample,
we nd that the optimal contract remains optimal for 75:5% of all CEOs under these assumptions.
For the remaining 24:5% the optimal contract is identical to the optimal contract without taxes (see
Table 2), except that more options are awarded to compensate the CEO for the tax payment.
Many other countries (including the U.K., Canada, Germany, and France) discourage the use
of in-the-money options, so the United States is not an exception (see Walker, 2009).20 A potential
reason is that the rest of the world generally tends to follow the U.S. when it comes to executive
compensation and especially executive stock options. Alternatively, one can argue that in-the-money
options cause some costs that are not included in our model and that justify government intervention.
Our results in Table 2 show that the use of in-the-money options is associated with large increases
in base salary. These might be di¢ cult to explain to shareholders and the general public, and might
cause social unrest and higher wage demands. Alternatively, there might be concerns that executives
19 It is not obvious that this second way to include taxes in our model is necessarily the more accurate one. Unrestricted
shares can also be seen as the result of restricted stock awarded in previous periods. If in-the-money options instead of
restricted stock had been issued in the previous periods, the tax penalty would have applied.
20Australia is the only country for which we could nd evidence that in-the-money options are commonly used. See
Rosser and Canil (2004).
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try to inuence the strike price of the option grants just as some appear to have done in the recent
backdating scandal. A commitment to using only at-the-money options could reduce this rent-seeking
activity, and our analysis shows that the costs of such a commitment are low.
5 Optimal nonlinear contracts
A limitation of our analysis so far is that we only consider piecewise linear contracts with one kink
(i.e. one option grant). In reality however, CEOs have many di¤erent option grants with di¤erent
strike prices, and we could augment our model by allowing for a second option grant with a di¤erent
strike price. Given the numerical di¢ culties in the case with one option, however, we do not consider
including a second option grant (and thereby two additional choice variables) as a fruitful strategy.
Instead, we now turn to the general non-linear contract. We theoretically derive the shape of the
optimal contract, parameterize it, and then numerically search for the cheapest contract with this
theoretically optimal shape. As any piecewise linear contract will be an approximation to this general
contract, we can infer the shape of any piecewise linear contract from this general contract. Moreover,
the savings of the general contract are an upper bound for the savings that can be achieved by any
piecewise linear contract.
5.1 Theoretical shape of the optimal contract
In this subsection we solve the shareholdersproblem and establish the shape of the optimal contract
(which is non-linear).
Proposition 1. (Optimal general contract): The optimal contract that solves the shareholders
problem (3), (4), (6), and (7) has the following functional form:
W T = 0 + 1 lnPT + 2(lnPT )
2; (20)
where 0, 1, and 2 depend on the distribution of PT and the Lagrange multipliers of the optimization
problem, with 2  0.
The full expressions for the parameters 0, 1, and 2 can be found in Appendix B together
with the proof of Proposition 1. The optimal contract in the standard principal agent model with
e¤ort aversion alone (i.e. without volatility incentive constraint (7)) has the same functional form
(20) with 2 = 0. If 2 = 0 and   1, the wage function is globally concave and therefore cannot
explain option contracts.
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Figure 2: The gure shows end of period wealthWT for the observed contract (solid line), the optimal
general contract (dashed line) and the optimal monotonic contract (dotted line) for a representative
CEO whose parameters are close to the median of the sample. The parameters are  = $1:1m, nS =
0:26%, nO = 0:92% for the observed contract. Initial non-rm wealth is W0 = $9:0m. P0 = $3:1bn,
 = 18:4%, and K=P0 = 63%, T = 6:3 years, rf = 4:4%, d = 1:7%. All calculations are for  = 3.
In Appendix B, we also show that the optimal contract is non-monotonic as long as 2 > 0. The
agents nal wealthWT decreases for low stock prices, reaches a minimum, and then increases again.21
Moreover, the function is convex for low stock prices and eventually becomes concave for high stock
prices. Figure 2 depicts the optimal general contract (broken line) for the representative CEO (see
Footnote 18 for the choice of the CEO and Section 2.3 for the calibration method). In addition, the
gure shows the observed piecewise linear contract (solid line) and the optimal monotonic contract
(dotted line) that we will introduce shortly.
The shape of the optimal general contract not only di¤ers markedly from observed contracts,
but it is also grossly counterintuitive. To understand this shape, we need to go back to the rst-order
approach which is violated by the general contract (20) (We show this more formally in Appendix
A.). Our optimization routine ensures that the observed choice (ed; d) remains a local optimum in
the managers decision calculus, but it does not guarantee that it stays the global optimum. The
new global optimum is obvious: choose e¤ort e and volatility  as low as possible, so that the end-of-
21For extremely low stock prices,WT will exceed the rm value PT which might not be possible under limited liability.
We could add a condition WT  PT to the optimization problem which would add a jag at the lowest stock prices
in Figure 2. As everything else remains unchanged, we work with the simpler, more intuitive problem without this
restriction. Note also that the rm could use an insurance to overcome the limited liability restriction.
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period rm value PT is as close to zero as possible. Hence, the "optimal" general contract provides
the agent with incentives to destroy the rm.22 Moreover when justifying our assumptions on P () at
the beginning of Section 2, we assumed that, given the level of volatility, the manager always chooses
a strategy that maximizes rm value. This assumption is also violated by the general contract (20).
We address these problems by restricting the contract to be monotonic, so that it cannot generate
perverse incentives.23 We therefore assume that the wage schedule WT (PT ) is di¤erentiable almost
everywhere and introduce the additional monotonicity constraint:24
dWT (PT )
dPT
 0 for all PT (21)
Proposition 2. (Optimal monotonic contract): The optimal contract that solves the sharehold-
ersproblem (3), (4), (6), (7), and (21) has the following functional form:
W T =
8<: 0 + 1 lnPT + 2(lnPT )2 if ln(PT ) >  
1
22
0   
2
1
42
if ln(PT )    122
(22)
where 0, 1, and 2 depend on the distribution of PT and the Lagrange multipliers of the optimization
problem, with 2 > 0.
The monotonic contract (22) is at where the general contract is decreasing, while the two
shapes are identical where the general contract is increasing. Even though the shape is identical, the
parameters 0, 1, and 2 will be di¤erent for the two contracts. As compensation is reduced in
bad states of the world where the general contract is decreasing, compensation must be increased in
good states of the world to satisfy the participation constraint. See Figure 2 for an illustration for
the representative CEO. A comparison of Figure 2 with Figure 1 shows that the monotonic contract
exhibits the same three features that are highlighted in Figure 1 for the piecewise linear contract.
Relative to the observed contract, the optimal contract punishes very poor outcomes less, rewards
22Note that the general contract (20) is globally optimal if the expected stock price E(PT ) is bounded su¢ ciently far
away from zero no matter what action the manager chooses. Practically, this means that the manager cannot destroy
the rm for certain, even though realizations of PT close to zero remain possible. This assumption is defensible for
some rms (e.g. utilities), but not for others (e.g. internet start-ups). Core and Qian (2002) and Flor, Frimor, and
Munk (2006) also nd U-shaped optimal contracts. For Core and Qian (2002) this is not a problem, because they only
allow two e¤ort and two volatility choices. Flor, Frimor, and Munk (2006) restrict the contract shape to be monotonic
to avoid this problem.
23The obvious way to look at the second-order conditions in order to nd assumptions under which the rst-order
approach holds is not feasible, because the second-order conditions are too complicated. See Appendix A for a further
discussion of the validity of the rst-order approach.
24The di¤erentiability assumption simplies the formulation of the restriction and the proof. It is not needed for the
result in Proposition 2.
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very good outcomes less, and provides more e¤ort incentives in the center of the distribution where
the optimal contract is steeper than the observed contract.
By construction, the monotonic contract (22) does not provide the perverse incentives to destroy
the rm and therefore appears preferable to the general contract (20). Nevertheless, we still cannot
guarantee that the rst-order approach is valid here. For the proof of Proposition 2, we therefore still
need the assumption that the rst-order approach holds. In Appendix A, we numerically analyze
the validity of the rst-order approach and establish that for most CEOs in our sample there are
reasonable assumptions so that the CEOs will not deviate from the observed choice of e¤ort and
volatility under the optimal monotonic contract.
5.2 Empirical results
We now turn to calibrating the optimal general contract (20) and the optimal monotonic contract
(22). These contract shapes are dened by the three parameters 0, 1, and 2. As we also have three
constraints (15), (16), and (17), there are no degrees of freedom left to minimize costs. Therefore, we
just solve a system of three equations in three unknowns for every CEO in our sample. The contract
we obtain in this way is always cheaper than the observed contract, because the new contract has
the optimal functional form.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Table 3 shows our numerical results for the optimal general contract (Panel A) and the optimal
monotonic contract (Panel B) for six values of the risk-aversion parameter . We do not tabulate the
parameters 0, 1, and 2, as they cannot be interpreted independently of each other. Instead, the
table shows the managers minimum wealth (minW T (PT )), the location of the kink where the wage
function changes from at to increasing, the inection point where the wage function changes from
convex to concave, and the savings that can be generated by switching from the observed contract
to the optimal contract. Our discussion of Table 3 concentrates on the optimal monotonic contract
(Panel B) as the optimal general contract violates the rst-order approach except under very strong
assumptions (see Appendix A and Footnote 22).
Table 3, Panel B shows that for  = 3, rms can save on average 13% (median: 9%) of the
compensation costs if they replace the observed contract with the optimal monotonic contract. These
average savings are considerably higher than the 4% savings for our representative CEO in Figure
2. This observation illustrates that calibrations to average or "typical" values can be misleading and
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that calibrations to individual data are necessary. Similarly to the piecewise linear contract described
in Table 2, savings increase as the risk-aversion parameter  increases in Table 3, because improved
risk-sharing becomes more important if the manager is more risk-averse.
The location of the kink is on average 56% of the beginning-of-period stock price, i.e. the
manager receives his minimum pay if the stock price drops by 1  56% = 44% or more. The average
inection point is 75% for  = 3, so the wage scheme is convex for any stock price PT below 0:75P0,
and concave above this point. Even though the monotonic contract allows for a convex region, the
contract is concave over the range of the most likely outcomes. The reason for the concavity is
the CEOs decreasing marginal utility: the richer the CEO is, the less interested he is in additional
wealth. Consequently, the inection point decreases and the concavity region increases as the CEOs
risk aversion increases.
The optimal monotonic contract provides complete downside protection. Table 3, Panel B
displays descriptive statistics for the CEOs minimum wealth min(W T ) relative to the beginning-of-
period wealth W0 for this contract. It shows that none of the CEOs in our sample would have to
invest part of their personal wealth in the rm as long as   1. For  = 3, the average minimum
wealth is 2:2 times initial non-rm wealth W0, while the median minimum wealth is 1:4 times initial
wealth. Even after extremely poor performance, the typical CEO in our sample will increase his
personal wealth by 40%. This result is in stark contrast to optimal contracts from more standard
principal-agent models with e¤ort incentives only (see Dittmann and Maug (2007)), where managers
are required to put a large part of their wealth at risk. Intuitively, limiting the downside for bad
outcomes provides better (i.e. cheaper) risk-taking incentives than rewarding good outcomes.
By construction, the savings from the optimal general contract (Table 3, Panel A) are higher
than those from the optimal monotonic contract (Panel B). The average di¤erence is 3:5% (= 16:4% 
12:9%) for  = 3, so the average costs of restricting the optimal contract to be monotonic are small.
A comparison of the two panels of Table 3 further yields that the location of the minimum payout
and the inection point are both higher for the monotonic contract. This contract features a larger
convex region that is needed to provide the same incentives as the general contract. Also, the CEOs
minimum wealth is much higher for the monotonic contract than for the general contract, where 41%
of the CEOs can lose some (but never more than 40%) of their wealth for  = 3.
The optimal piecewise linear contracts analyzed in Section 3 are an approximation to the shape
of the optimal monotonic contract. Optimal piecewise linear contracts feature no stock holdings and
options that are deep in the money. This approximation generates (on average for  = 3) savings
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of 5:3%, and it can be improved upon by allowing for additional option grants with di¤erent strike
prices. The optimal contract will then feature no stock, a large long position in an option grant that
is deep in the money and many smaller short positions in option grants with higher strike prices.
In this way, a piecewise linear contract can approximate the concave shape of the optimal contract
for medium and high stock prices. The upper bound for the savings that can be realized by such
a piecewise linear contract is 12:9%, which are the savings of the optimal monotonic contract from
Table 3, Panel B.
6 Robustness Checks
Sample selection bias Our data set is subject to a moderate survivorship bias, as we require
that CEOs are covered by the ExecuComp database for at least ve years. Table 1 demonstrates
that younger and less successful CEOs are underrepresented in our data set. We therefore divide our
sample in quintiles according to four variables: CEOsnon-rm wealth W0, CEO age, rm value P0,
and the past ve yearsstock return. Table 4 displays for these subsamples the average savings as a
percentage of pay that rms could realize by switching to the optimal piecewise linear contract. The
last line shows the p-value of the Wilcoxon test that average savings are identical in the rst and the
fth quintile.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
The table shows that savings are considerably higher for younger and especially less wealthy
CEOs. With constant relative risk-aversion, higher wealth implies lower absolute risk-aversion and
consequently fewer gains from e¢ cient risk-sharing. The table also demonstrates that smaller rms
and those with poor past performance would benet more from recontracting. Their CEOs typically
have options that are less in-the-money or even out-of-the-money. Therefore, the payout pattern of
their options di¤ers more from that of their stock holdings than it does for more successful CEOs. In
our model, savings are generated by replacing the portfolio of stock and options with an option grant
that is "intermediate" in the sense that its strike price lies between the strike price of the original
option and zero, which is the "strike price" of stock. The scope for these savings is larger, if stock and
options in the observed contract di¤er more from one another, i.e. if the strike price of the original
option is high. This suggests that our full sample results are biased downwards and that the average
savings in the unbiased sample would be somewhat higher than the 5:3% shown in Table 2.
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Wealth robustness check CEO wealth is not observable and we can therefore work only with
a rough approximation. In order to see to what extent our results depend on our wealth estimates,
we repeat our analysis after multiplying the wealth estimate of all CEOs by a factor M that ranges
from 0:5 to 2. Table 5 displays the results for  = 3.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
A comparison of Table 2, Panel A and Table 6 shows that an increase in wealth W0 has a
similar e¤ect as a decrease in the risk aversion parameter . With constant relative risk-aversion,
higher wealth implies lower absolute risk-aversion. This leads to more options, a higher strike price,
and lower savings. In absolute terms, however, the variation of our results across di¤erent wealth
multipliersM is small. We therefore conclude that the imprecision in our wealth estimates is unlikely
to bias our results signicantly. Our qualitative results are certainly not a¤ected.
CEO preferences The CEOs attitude to risk is central to our model. So far we have assumed
that the CEOs preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). In order to see whether
our results are robust to alternative assumptions on CEO risk aversion, we repeat our analysis
from Table 2 with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), so that V CARA (WT ) =   exp ( WT )
replaces V (WT ) in equation (2). To maintain comparability with our previous results, we calculate
the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion  from  so that both utility functions exhibit the same
risk-aversion at the expected end-of-period wealth, i.e. we set  = =(W0 + 0), where 0 is the
market value of the managers contract (i.e., the costs of the contract to the rm). Table 6 displays
the results for six di¤erent values of .
[Insert Table 6 here.]
The results are quite similar to those for CRRA in Table 2, Panel A. With CARA preferences,
the strike price is somewhat higher than with CRRA preferences: for  = 3 the strike price averages
52:1% for CARA instead of 50:5% for CRRA. Savings from recontracting are higher for CARA
than for CRRA for low values of risk-aversion ( < 3) while the opposite holds for high values of
risk-aversion ( > 3). We conclude that our results continue to hold for CARA utility.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent does not only exert e¤ort but
also determines the rms strategy and thereby its stock return volatility. In this model, the choice
of a more risky strategy has two e¤ects on the managers compensation. The rst, obvious e¤ect
is that higher volatility makes future payo¤s more risky, so that the utility a risk-averse manager
derives from restricted stock drops. This e¤ect has already been analyzed extensively in the literature
(see Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991; Guay, 1999; Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004). The second
e¤ect that has so far been neglected by the empirical literature is that a more risky rm strategy
also increases expected rm value. The reason is that the rst-best solution, where the optimal
management strategy is chosen irrespective of its risk, is not achievable. In the second-best solution,
the manager passes up some protable but risky projects as these would reduce his utility, or he adopts
some unprotable but safe projects that increase his utility. If the rms strategy is adjusted and
becomes more risky in this second-best environment, more protable and less unprotable projects
will be adopted and rm value increases. Therefore, it is not su¢ cient to only consider the direct
impact of an increase in risk on a managers compensation package (vega) to determine his attitude
towards an increase in risk. The indirect e¤ect via an increase in rm value and the managers equity
incentives (delta) must also be taken into account. Our paper provides - to the best of our knowledge
- the rst empirical analysis of a full principal agent model that takes both e¤ects into account.
When we look at piecewise linear contracts consisting of xed salary, stock, and an option grant,
we nd optimal contracts that look very di¤erent from observed compensation practice. According to
the model, managers should not receive any stock but instead in-the-money options and higher xed
salary. However, the savings generated by switching to this optimal contract are low and average
only 5:3%. This suggests that observed compensation practice is close to the optimum and that a
slight preference of shareholders for stock, for at-the-money options, or against an increase in base
salary renders observed compensation practice e¢ cient. One such e¤ect included in our model in a
robustness check is the extra tax that must be paid by the rm and the CEO if options are issued in
the money. These tax penalties are prohibitive for most rms, i.e. they render the observed contract
e¢ cient if they are taken into account. But even in the absence of such taxes, the observed contract
can easily be optimal if rms have a preference not to increase base salaries and are willing to forgo
the 5:3% savings. In times of an increasingly hot public debate on executive compensation, such an
upward restriction on base salaries appears plausible.25
25See Hall and Murphy (2000) for an alternative justication of at-the-money strike prices.
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A limitation of our main analysis is its restriction to a single option grant (with a single strike
price). In order to understand optimal contracts with more than one option grant, we derive and
estimate the general monotonic contract that is not restricted to be piecewise linear. Any piece-
wise linear contract with a given number of option grants will be an approximation to this general
monotonic contract. We nd that the optimal monotonic contract pays a at wage for low outcomes
and is increasing and eventually concave over medium and high outcomes. Therefore, it can be
implemented by a high xed salary (twice the observed salary for the median CEO), long option
holdings with low, in-the-money strike price, and short option holdings with higher strike prices. Al-
ternatively, it can be approximated by xed salary and a linear bonus scheme with an upper bound
on the bonus payout (see Healy, 1985). Such a contract would save up to 12:9% for the average rm.
Another limitation of our analysis is that our model is static and considers only two points in
time: the time of contract negotiation and the time when the nal stock price is realized. Realistically,
a bad or unlucky CEO is likely to be replaced if the stock price drops by more than 50%.26 Such
a dismissal has two consequences. First it might a¤ect rm performance if the new CEO is more
skilled than the ousted CEO. This e¤ect is beyond the scope of our model, as at least two periods are
necessary to describe it. Second, dismissals negatively a¤ect the payout of the ousted CEO, mainly
because it reduces the CEOs future employment opportunities. Our model predicts a at pay for low
levels of stock price, so this negative e¤ect of a dismissal is undesirable. Consequently, our analysis
can also be interpreted as a justication of severance pay that compensates the manager for his loss
in human capital (see Yermack (2006)).
26Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Kaplan (1994), and Jenter and Kanaan (2006), among others, analyze the sensitivity
of dismissals to past stock price performance.
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Appendix A: Validity of the rst-order approach
Like most of the theoretical literature on executive compensation, we work with the rst order
approach: we replace the incentive compatibility constraint (5) by the two rst-order conditions
(6) and (7). This approach is only valid if the utility which the agent maximizes has exactly one
optimum, and a su¢ cient condition is that this utility is globally concave. In our model, this su¢ cient
condition does not hold, and it is possible that the rst-order approach is violated. The literature
has developed a few approaches to check or ensure the validity of the rst-order approach, but none
of these existing solutions works for our model.27 We therefore develop a new approach here.
A violation of the rst-order approach has two potential consequences. First, the agent might
choose a di¤erent combination of e¤ort e and volatility  than under the observed contract. The
reason is that our optimization routine only ensures that the pair fed; dg (which is implemented by
the observed contract) remains a local optimum under the new contract, but we do not require it to
be the global optimum (see Lambert and Larcker (2004) and especially the discussion of their Figure
1). Second, a violation of the rst-order approach implies that there might be more than one solution
to the optimization problem. We tackle the second problem by repeating our numerical optimizations
with di¤erent starting values, but we do not nd any indication that there are multiple solutions
for any CEO in our sample. In this appendix, we therefore concentrate on the rst problem. In
particular, we analyze whether the agent has an incentive under a given alternative contract to shirk,
i.e., to choose e¤ort e 6= ed or volatility  6= d such that P0(e; ) < P d0 = P0(ed; d). We ignore
deviations that lead to an increase of rm value as shareholders are not likely to worry about this
case. For expositional convenience, we say that the rst-order approach is violated for a particular
contract if the agent shirks under this contract.
We rst recognize that the agents choice of e¤ort e and volatility  can be rephrased as a choice
27For the one-dimensional e¤ort aversion problem, Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988) derive a number of su¢ cient
conditions for the rst-order approach to hold. These results cannot readily be extended to the two-dimensional case
where the agent also chooses volatility. Moreover, these conditions only work if the contract shape is not restricted,
so they would be useful only for the general contract (20). Hellwig (2008) solves a principal-agent model with e¤ort
and volatility choice without resorting to the rst-order approach by assuming that the agent is risk-neutral. This
approach does not generalize to risk-averse agents, however, and we cannot use Hellwigs results, because risk-aversion
is a central point in our argument. If the agent were risk neutral, any contract that provides the necessary incentives
would be optimal, because principal and agent would always agree on the value of a contract. As a consequence, there
would be innitely many optimal contract shapes. For the one-dimensional e¤ort aversion problem, Dittmann and
Maug (2007) derive a su¢ cient condition that can be evaluated numerically. We have derived similar conditions for
our model, but it turns out that they are nearly always violated. Lambert (1986) shows that the rst-order approach
holds in his stylized model with two feasible volatility levels and three feasible rm value outcomes. In our opinion,
such a model is not rich enough to be meaningfully calibrated to observed data. Finally, Armstrong, Larcker, and Su
(2007) work with strong assumptions on the cost function C(e) and production function P0(e). They calibrate these
functions to the data and calculate the optimal contract without using the rst-order approach. We are skeptical that
cost functions and production functions can be inferred from observable data, so we do not follow this approach.
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of expected rm value P0 and volatility , because P0 = P0(e; ) is monotonically increasing in e for
every . The following proposition provides a condition when the agent does not deviate from the
observed e¤ort-volatility choice.
Proposition 3. (First-order approach): Let W dT denote the observed contract that implements
the observed volatility d and the observed rm value P d0 . Consider an alternative, cheaper contract
W T of a given shape that solves our optimization problem (i.e. it minimizes E (W

T (PT )) subject to
the participation constraint (16) and the two incentive compatibility constraints (15) and (17)).
1. If
E

V (W T )jP 00; 0

< E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
, for all feasible fP 00; 0g with P 00 < P d0 , (23)
there exist pairs fC(e); P0(e; )g of cost functions and production functions such that the agent
does not choose a combination of e¤ort and volatility that results in a lower expected rm value
P0 under the cheaper contract W T .
2. A choice fP 00; 0g with P 00 < P d0 is infeasible, if the agent prefers it to fP d0 ; dg under the
observed contract. A necessary condition for fP 00; 0g being infeasible is
E
h
V (W dT )jP 00; 0
i
> E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
(24)
for all or a subset of the pairs fC(e); P0(e; )g identied in part (1).
Part 1 of Proposition 3 provides a condition under which there are assumptions that guarantee
that the rst-order approach is not violated. If condition (23) holds at some point fP 00; 0g, the
agents utility from money is higher at the observed choice fP d0 ; dg than at the alternative choice
fP 00; 0g. Therefore, the agent will not deviate from the observed choice, if the additional e¤ort costs
that fP d0 ; dg involves relative to fP 00; 0g do not reverse inequality (23). This is the case if the
cost function is not too steep. Further below in this Appendix, we therefore check condition (23)
numerically in order to establish whether the rst-order approach is violated or (possibly) not.
Part 1 of Proposition 3 gives an indication what type of assumptions must be made to ensure the
validity of the rst-order approach. In addition to assumptions on cost function C(e) and production
function P0(e; ), we need assumptions on the set of outcomes fP0; g that are feasible. Based on
information contained in the observed contract, Part 2 of Proposition 3 identies outcomes that are
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infeasible and must therefore lie outside the feasibility set. For example, the combination fP d0 ; 0g,
where volatility is reduced to zero while the expected stock price stays constant, is obviously preferred
by the agent to the observed combination fP d0 ; dg. However, any combination fP d0 ; g with  < d
must be infeasible, because the agent would have chosen it if it had been feasible. Part 2 of Proposition
3 extends this reasoning to all values P 00 < P d0 . Our argument is reminiscent of the revealed preferences
approach, although we do not infer utility but rather the feasibility of an action.
In order to check condition (23) numerically, we have to make an assumption as to what com-
binations fP 00; 0g are feasible. We assume that there is for each P 00 a lower bound mf (P 00) (the
minimum feasible volatility), so that fP 00; 0g is feasible if and only if 0 > mf (P 00). Part 2 of Propo-
sition 3 provides a su¢ cient condition for a combination fP 00; 0g to be infeasible. As the agents
utility decreases in volatility , we can derive a lower bound for the minimum feasible volatility
mf (P 00) from this condition:
mf (P 00) = min
n
  0jE(V (W dT )jP 00; )  E(V (W dT )jP d0 ; d)
o
: (25)
This lower bound rules out combinations fP 00; 0g which we know must be infeasible from the observed
contract. Clearly, a point that lies just above this lower bound is not automatically feasible. If such
a point were feasible, the observed contract would not be robust to slight perturbations, e.g., in the
agents cost function. While we cannot rule this out on a theoretical basis as our model does not
allow for such complications, we feel that this is unlikely to occur in practice. We therefore set the
minimum feasible volatility to
mf (P 00) = w
mf (P 00) + (1  w)d; (26)
where w 2 [0; 1]. We use ve di¤erent weights w in our numerical analysis: w = 1, 0:95, 0:9, 0:75,
and 0:5. w = 1 is the most conservative assumption that only rules out those combinations fP 00; 0g
that are certainly infeasible. For lower values of w we make increasingly stronger assumptions that
reduce the number of feasible combinations.
We also need an upper bound for the feasible volatility in our numerical analysis. We arbitrarily
use 2d, i.e., we assume that the manager cannot increase the rms stock return volatility by more
than 100%. This assumption is innocuous, because violations of the rst-order approach typically
occur at low levels of volatility. For each CEO in our sample, we generate a grid with 2,500 points
that is given by 50 equally spaced points in the interval (0; P d0 ] for P
0
0 and 50 equally spaced points
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in the interval (mf (P 00); 2d] for 0, where mf (P 00) is the minimum feasible sigma from (26). We
check condition (23) for each grid point and calculate the proportion of CEOs for whom condition
(23) is violated for at least one grid point. Table 7 reports the "proportion with certain violation"
for three values of  (1, 3, and 5). For this proportion of the CEOs in our sample, the rst-order
approach is violated. For the remaining CEOs, there are cost and production functions such that
the rst-order approach is not violated.
[Insert Table 7 here.]
The table shows that for  = 3 and w = 1, the rst-order approach is certainly violated for
82:4% of the CEOs in our sample under the optimal piecewise-linear contract. For the monotonic
and the general contracts, the respective probabilities are 92:3% and 99:6%. As argued above, w = 1
is a very conservative assumption, and for lower values of w the proportion of CEOs for which the
rst-order approach is certainly violated falls for the linear and the monotonic contracts (but not
for the general contract). For w = 0:75, the rst-order approach is certainly violated only for one
third of the CEOs in our sample for the piecewise linear contract and for half of the CEOs for the
monotonic contract. For w = 0:5, the proportion with certain violations drops to below 10% for these
two contracts. A comparison across di¤erent values of risk-aversion shows that violations are less
frequent if risk-aversion is low: for w = 0:75 and the monotonic contract, the proportion of CEOs
with certain violation is only 12:1% for  = 1 compared to 51:6% for  = 3 and 63:9% for  = 5. In
contrast, the rst-order approach is virtually always violated for the general contract, independently
of the value of w.
Finally, we investigate whether the results reported in this paper change if we consider only
those CEOs for whom the rst-order approach is not certainly violated. We recalculate Tables 2
and 3 for two di¤erent assumptions on the minimum feasible volatility from equation (26) given by
w = 0:75 and w = 0:9 (results not reported in the tables). We nd lower savings but otherwise
similar results. For  = 3 and w = 0:75, average savings are 2:7% for the linear contract (compared
to 5:3% in the full sample) and 10:4% for the monotonic contract (compared to 12:9% in the full
sample). For w = 0:9, the savings are 1:5% and 8:9%, respectively. Hence, the optimal contract
predicted by our model is "more likely" to violate the rst-order approach if the predicted savings
are high. This is intuitive, because an optimal contract with low savings by construction must be
very similar to the observed contract. As we assume that the observed contract does not violate the
rst-order approach, this will also be true for the optimal contract.
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To conclude, this appendix demonstrates that the rst-order approach can be justied for the
monotonic and the piecewise-linear contract, but not for the general contract. We show that the
rst-order approach is valid under realistic (although possibly strong) assumptions for most CEOs
in our sample, and we show that our qualitative results are not a¤ected if we exclude those CEOs
for whom the rst-order approach is violated.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The Lagrangian is
L =
Z 1
0
[PT  WT ] g(PT je; )dPT + PC
Z 1
0
V (WT ; e)g(PT je; )dPT   C(e)  U

(27)
+ e
Z 1
0
V (WT )ge(PT je; )dPT   dC
de

+ 
Z 1
0
V (WT )g(PT je; )dPT ;
where g(PT je; ) is the (lognormal) density function of end-of-period stock price PT :
g(PT je; ) = 1
PT
p
22T
exp[ (lnPT   (e; ))
2
22T
] (28)
with
(e; ) = lnP0(e; ) + (rf   2=2)T: (29)
ge and g are the derivatives of g(:) with respect to e and . We di¤erentiate (27) with respect to
WT and set this derivative equal to zero:
g(PT je; ) = PCVWT g(PT je; ) + eVWT ge(PT je; ) + VWT g(PT je; ):
Some rearranging yields:
1
VWT (WT )
= PC + e
ge
g
+ 
g
g
: (30)
For the log-normal distribution (28) we get:
ge = g  lnPT   (e; )
2T
 e(e; )
g = g  [lnPT   (e; )]  (e; )  
2T + [lnPT   (e; )]2T
(2T )2
  g

= g  [lnPT   ]     + [lnPT   ]
2
3T
  g

:
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Substituting this into the rst-order condition (30) yields (together with the assumption of constant
relative risk aversion (2)):
W T = PC + e
[lnPT   ]  e
2T
+ 

[lnPT   ]     + [lnPT   ]2
3T
  1


:
From inspection, the optimal wage contract can be written as (20) with parameters 0, 1, and 2:
0 = PC   ee  
2T
  

  
2T
  
2
3T
+
1


;
1 = e
e
2T
+ 


2T
  2
3T

;
2 = 
1
3T
 0:
Lemma 1. (Shape of the general contract):
(1) The agent receives the lowest payout min fWT (PT )g at the stock price P= exp
n
  122
o
. The
wage function decreases monotonically for P <P and increases monotonically for P >P .
(2) If   1, the wage function is concave for P > exp
n
1  122
o
.
Proof of Lemma 1: The rst derivative of the wage function (20) with respect to the end-of-
period stock price PT is
dWT
dPT
=
1

W 1 T  22  (lnPT +
1
22
)  1
PT
: (31)
Therefore, the rst derivative is zero if and only if PT = exp(  122 ). The second derivative of the
wage function WT is
d2WT
dP 2T
=
1  
2
W 1 2T 

22 

lnPT +
1
22

 1
PT
2
+
1

W 1 T  22 
1
P 2T

1  lnPT   1
22

(32)
=
1

W 1 T  22 
1
P 2T
"
1  

22W
 
T

lnPT +
1
22
2
+

1  lnPT   1
22
#
. (33)
For PT = exp(  122 ), the second derivative is positive, which proves statement (1). If   1 and
lnPT +
1
22
> 1, the second derivative (33) is negative, so the wage function is concave in this region,
and this proves statement (2).
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that the monotonicity constraint (21) must hold for every PT ,
so that it is actually a continuum of innitely many restrictions. We rst rewrite the restriction as a
function ofWT . Let h(:) be the function that maps PT intoWT : WT = h(PT ). Then PT = h 1(WT ),
and dWTdPT (PT ) = h
0(h 1(WT )). Hence, (21) can be rewritten as
h0(h 1(WT ))  0: (34)
For every WT , (21) provides one restriction, so the Lagrangian for the di¤erentiation at WT is:
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LWT =
Z 1
0
[PT  WT ] g(PT je; )dPT + PC
Z 1
0
V (WT ; e)g(PT je; )dPT   C(e)  U

+ e
Z 1
0
V (WT )ge(PT je; )dPT   dC
de

+ 
Z 1
0
V (WT )g(PT je; )dPT
+ WT h
0(h 1(WT )):
The rst-order condition then is
g(PT je; ) = PCVWT g(PT je; ) + eVWT ge(PT je; ) + VWT g(PT je; ) (35)
+ WT
h00(h 1(WT )
h0(h 1(WT )
:
While there is one multiplier WT for each value of WT , the other three multipliers PC , e, and
 are the same across all values of WT (as before). If the constraint (34) is binding, equation (35)
denes the Lagrange multiplier WT , and the solution is determined by the binding monotonicity
constraint. If (34) is not binding, WT is zero and the rst-order condition (35) simplies to the
rst-order condition from Proposition 1, that is equation (30). Consequently, the solution is the
same as long as it is monotonically increasing, and at otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3, Part 1: Consider the observed contract W dT that implements the
e¤ort ed and the observed volatility d. Let fe0; 0g be an alternative feasible choice for the manager
that results in a lower stock price. Under the assumption that our model is correct and that the
agents observed choice fed; dg is indeed optimal, we have (from (5)):
E
h
V (W dT )je0; 0
i
  C(e0)  E
h
V (W dT )jed; d
i
  C(ed); (36)
The e¤ort e is not observable, but given the function P0(e; ), we can infer the e¤ort from P0(e; )
and . Hence, we can rewrite equation (36) as
E
h
V (W dT )jP 00; 0
i
  C(P 00; 0)  E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
  C(P d0 ; d): (37)
Inequality (37) must hold for every feasible alternative choice fP 00; 0g with P 00 < P d0 .
We now turn to one of the optimal contracts W T from our calibrations. This can be any of
the three optimal contracts that we analyze in the previous sections (piecewise linear, monotonic, or
general contract). Consider a choice fP 00; 0g with P 00 < P d0 and
E

V (W T )jP 00; 0

< E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
: (38)
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We need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: fP 00; 0g is associated with a lower e¤ort than fP d0 ; dg, so that C(P d0 ; d) C(P 00; 0) > 0.
We consider pairs of the cost function C(:) and production function P (:; :) such that
C(P d0 ; 
d)  C(P 00; 0) < E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
  E V (W T )jP 00; 0 : (39)
Rearranging yields
E

V (W T )jP 00; 0
  C(P 00; 0) < E hV (W dT )jP d0 ; di  C(P d0 ; d) (40)
= E
h
V (W T )jP d0 ; d
i
  C(P d0 ; d); (41)
where the second line follows from the fact that our calibrated contracts provide the manager with
the same utility as the observed contract (see equation (16)). Hence, under these assumptions on
C(:) and P0(:; :), the agent will prefer fP d0 ; dg to fP 00; 0g and the rst-order approach is (at this
point) not violated.
Case 2: fP 00; 0g is associated with a weakly higher e¤ort than fP d0 ; dg, so that C(P d0 ; d)  
C(P 00; 0)  0. Then (40) and (41) follow immediately from (38), so that the agent will prefer fP d0 ; dg
to fP 00; 0g and the rst-order approach is (at this point) not violated.
If the cost function C(:) is constant (or increasing and convex but su¢ ciently close to being
constant), equation (39) holds for all feasible combinations fP 00; 0g. Hence, if E [V (W T )jP 00; 0] <
E

V (W dT )jP d0 ; d

for all feasible fP 00; 0g, there are assumptions on C(:) and P0(:; :), such that the
rst-order approach is not violated.
Part 2: If (37) is violated for an alternative choice fP 00; 0g with P 00 < P d0 , the agent would
prefer it to fP d0 ; dg. The fact that we observe fP d0 ; dg.then indicates that fP 00; 0g is infeasible.
If fP 00; 0g is associated with a lower e¤ort than fP d0 ; dg (Case 1), then a su¢ cient condition for
fP 00; 0g being infeasible is that
E
h
V (W dT )jP 00; 0
i
> E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
: (42)
If fP 00; 0g is associated with a higher e¤ort than fP d0 ; dg (Case 2), then (42) is a su¢ cient condition
for fP 00; 0g being infeasible only if the cost function and production function are such that
C(P 00; 
0)  C(P d0 ; d) < E
h
V (W dT )jP 00; 0
i
  E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
: (43)
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Equations (42) and (43) then imply
E
h
V (W dT )jP 00; 0
i
  C(P 00; 0) > E
h
V (W dT )jP d0 ; d
i
  C(P d0 ; d), (44)
so that the agent would prefer fP 00; 0g to fP d0 ; dg under the observed contract, so fP 00; 0g must be
infeasible. The additional restriction on the cost function and the production function in (43) holds
if the cost function C(:) is "at enough" (i.e. increasing and convex but su¢ ciently close to being
constant). This is the same requirement on C(:) as in Part 1 of the proof.
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Table 1: Description of the dataset 
This table displays mean, median, standard deviation, and the 10% and 90% quantile of the variables in our 
dataset. Stock holdings nS and option holdings nO are expressed as a percentage of all outstanding shares. 
Panel A describes our sample of 737 CEOs from 2006. Panel B describes all 1,490 executives in the 
ExecuComp universe who are CEO in 2006. 
 
Panel A: Data set with 737 U.S. CEOs 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile
Stock (%) nS 1.76% 4.85% 0.04% 0.31% 3.96% 
Options (%) nO 1.40% 1.62% 0.15% 0.96% 3.19% 
Base Salary ($m) φ 1.60 4.29 0.50 1.07 2.43 
Non-firm Wealth ($m) W0 64.9 671.5 2.3 11.1 64.1 
Firm Value ($m) P0 9,347 23,296 366 2,418 19,614 
Strike Price ($m) K 6,929 20,209 236 1,556 12,853 
Moneyness (%) K/P0 70.6% 21.1% 42.1% 71.8% 99.9% 
Maturity (years) T 5.2 1.6 3.6 5.0 6.6 
Stock Volatility (%) σ 30.3% 13.6% 16.5% 28.5% 45.8% 
Dividend Rate (%) d 1.37% 3.96% 0.00% 0.66% 3.38% 
CEO Age (years)  55.9 6.8 47 56 64 
Stock Return 2001-5 (%) 11.8% 15.5% -5.7% 11.5% 28.8% 
 
Panel B: All 1,490 ExecuComp CEOs in 2006 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile
Stock (%) nS 1.95% 6.26% 0.02% 0.28% 4.22% 
Options (%) nO 1.26% 1.57% 0.08% 0.79% 2.88% 
Base Salary ($m) φ 1.68 4.01 0.48 1.02 2.63 
Firm Value ($m) P0 8,840 24,760 339 2,091 17,796 
CEO Age (years)  55.1 7.1 46 55 64 
Stock Return 2001-5 (%) 10.5% 23.2% -13.8% 9.8% 34.1% 
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Table 2: Optimal piecewise linear contracts 
This table describes the optimal piecewise linear contract. The table displays mean and median of the four contract parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS*, 
option holdings nO*, and the moneyness, i.e. the option strike price K* scaled by the stock price P0. In addition, it shows the fraction of CEOs with non-positive 
salaries (φ* ≤ 0), the fraction of CEOs with zero stock holdings (nS* = 0), and the fraction of CEOs with non-positive option holdings (nO* ≤ 0). Savings are the 
difference in compensation costs between observed contracts and optimal contracts as a percentage of total (observed) pay: (π0d – π0*)/π0d. The last row shows the 
corresponding values of the observed contract. Panel A shows the results for six different values of the parameter of risk aversion γ. The number of observations 
varies across different values of γ because we exclude all CEO-γ-combinations for which the observed contract implies positive risk-taking incentives RTI from 
equation (13). Panel B displays the results for those 282 CEOs for whom our numerical routine converges for all γ between 1 and 8. 
 
Panel A: Results for all 737 CEOs 
 
Base Salary φ* ($m)  Stock nS*  Options nO*  Moneyness K*/P0  Savings Risk 
Aversion Obs. 
Con-
verged Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median Prop=0  Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median  Mean Median
0.5 537 120 1.44 1.22 13.3% 0.62% 0.00% 80.8% 2.39% 1.60% 5.83% 55.7% 57.5% 0.11% 0.04%
1.0 665 394 4.73 2.46 0.0% 0.02% 0.00% 98.5% 2.49% 1.55% 1.52% 54.4% 54.5% 0.41% 0.16%
2.0 720 613 7.90 3.21 0.0% 0.04% 0.00% 98.9% 2.51% 1.39% 0.82% 53.2% 54.2% 2.09% 0.86%
3.0 735 654 7.68 3.15 0.0% 0.10% 0.00% 98.8% 2.15% 1.33% 0.46% 50.5% 50.9% 5.32% 2.56%
5.0 735 604 6.56 2.81 0.0% 0.26% 0.00% 95.9% 1.60% 1.14% 0.00% 44.7% 44.8% 14.01% 9.31%
8.0 737 442 4.66 2.08 0.2% 0.28% 0.00% 88.0% 1.14% 0.86% 0.23% 39.8% 39.8% 26.46% 22.20%
Data 737 N/A 1.60 1.07 0.0% 1.76% 0.31% 1.2% 1.40% 0.96% 5.16% 70.6% 71.8% N/A N/A
 
 
Panel B: Results for 282 CEOs with numerical results for all levels of risk-aversion 
 
Fixed Salary φ* ($m)  Stock nS*  Options nO*  Moneyness K*/P0  Savings Risk 
Aversion Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median Prop=0  Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median  Mean Median
1.0 4.08 2.18 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 100.0% 2.54% 1.86% 0.00% 54.1% 55.0% 0.48% 0.20%
2.0 3.85 2.11 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 100.0% 2.38% 1.77% 0.00% 50.6% 51.1% 3.16% 1.61%
3.0 3.64 2.03 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 100.0% 2.16% 1.65% 0.00% 47.0% 47.3% 8.12% 5.15%
5.0 3.27 1.83 0.0% 0.15% 0.00% 97.5% 1.60% 1.23% 0.00% 40.6% 41.1% 20.05% 17.37%
8.0 2.76 1.65 0.4% 0.23% 0.00% 87.2% 1.11% 0.86% 0.00% 34.4% 32.9% 33.97% 35.44%
Data 1.27 0.94 0.0% 0.70% 0.31% 1.8% 1.92% 1.47% 0.00% 68.2% 68.3% N/A N/A
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Table 3: Optimal general and optimal monotonic contracts 
This table describes the optimal general contract (from equation (20)) in Panel A and the optimal monotonic contract (from equation (22)) in Panel B for six 
different values of the risk-aversion parameter γ. The table displays the mean and median of the savings, the inflection point, the location of the minimum wage 
(in Panel A) and the location of the kink (in Panel B). Savings are the difference in compensation costs between observed contract and optimal contract expressed 
as a percentage of costs of the observed contract, (π0d – π0*)/π0d. The inflection point is the end-of-period stock price PT where the wage scheme turns from convex 
to concave. The location of the minimum (Panel A) is the end-of-period stock price PT where the agent receives the smallest wage. The location of the kink (Panel 
B) is the end-of-period stock price PT where the wage schedule W(PT ) starts to increase. The inflection point, the location of the minimum, and the location of the 
kink are expressed as percentage of the beginning-of-period stock price P0. The table also shows descriptive statistics for the minimum payout min(WT*) scaled 
by the observed non-firm wealth W0. The number of observations varies across different values of γ because we exclude all CEO-γ-combinations for which the 
observed contract implies positive risk-taking incentives RTI from equation (13). 
 
Panel A: Optimal general contract 
 
Savings  Location of minimum  Inflection point  Minimum wealth 0
*
Tmin(W ) / W  Risk 
Aversio
n 
Obs. Con-verged Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median Min. Max. Freq. < 1
0.5  537 517  0.23% 0.05% 23% 23% 185% 153% 2.4 1.2 0.0 201.3 19% 
1.0  665 632  1.63% 0.51% 35% 35% 96% 95% 2.6 1.2 0.4 228.3 22% 
2.0  720 687  8.01% 4.48% 40% 40% 64% 63% 1.8 1.1 0.5 170.6 34% 
3.0  735 557  16.44% 12.87% 40% 39% 55% 55% 1.4 1.1 0.6 84.8 41% 
5.0  735 274  31.67% 30.18% 36% 34% 46% 45% 1.2 1.1 0.8 3.6 32% 
8.0  737 178  47.99% 51.20% 29% 24% 37% 33% 1.1 1.1 0.9 3.6 25% 
 
Panel B: Optimal monotonic contract 
 
Savings  Location of kink  Inflection point  Minimum wealth 0
*
Tmin(W ) / W  Risk 
Aversio
n 
Obs. Con-verged Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median Min. Max. Freq. < 1
0.5  537 335  0.2% 0.0%  27% 23%  205% 158%  3.0 1.3 0.0 227.8 11% 
1.0  665 622  0.9% 0.3%  45% 43%  121% 116%  3.1 1.4 1.0 249.4 0% 
2.0  720 711  5.4% 3.0%  55% 54%  85% 85%  2.9 1.4 1.0 242.1 0% 
3.0  735 665  12.9% 9.2%  56% 57%  75% 76%  2.2 1.4 1.0 186.6 0% 
5.0  735 523  30.0% 29.3%  50% 50%  61% 60%  1.5 1.3 1.0 25.5 0% 
8.0  737 398  46.1% 47.9%  44% 43%  52% 51%  1.3 1.2 1.0 4.3 0% 
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Table 4: Savings from recontracting for subsamples 
This table shows average savings for quintiles formed according to four variables: initial non-firm wealth 
W0, CEO age, firm value P0, and the past five year stock return (from the start of 2001 to the end of 2005). 
The risk-aversion parameter γ is set equal to 3. Savings are the difference in compensation costs between 
observed contract and optimal piecewise linear contract expressed as a percentage of costs of the observed 
contract, (π0d – π0*)/π0d. The last row shows the p-value of the two-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test that 
the average savings are identical in Quintile 1 and Quintile 5. 
 
Wealth W0  
(in $m)   CEO Age  
Firm Value P0  
(in $m)  
Stock return  
2001-2005 Quin-tile 
Mean Savings   Mean Savings  Mean Savings  Mean Savings 
1 2.2 10.0% 46.2 7.3% 381 8.7% -9.1% 9.7% 
2 5.4 5.7% 51.5 5.3% 1,122 5.5% 4.9% 5.0% 
3 10.3 4.6% 55.1 4.5% 2,462 4.3% 11.2% 4.0% 
4 21.5 4.4% 57.9 5.7% 6,406 4.0% 17.2% 3.9% 
5 246.3 2.0% 63.4 4.1% 33,935 4.1% 32.8% 4.0% 
P-Value Q1-Q5 0.0000     0.0001    0.0001    0.0000
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Table 5: Wealth robustness check 
This table contains the results from repeating our analysis from Table 2 when we multiply our wealth estimates by the factor M, for M ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 1.5, 2.0}. The 
risk-aversion parameter γ is set equal to 3. The table displays mean and median of the four contract parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS*, option holdings 
nO*, and the moneyness, i.e. the option strike price K* scaled by the stock price P0. In addition, it shows the fraction of CEOs with non-positive salaries (φ* ≤ 0), 
the fraction of CEOs with zero stock holdings (nS* = 0), and the fraction of CEOs with non-positive option holdings (nO* ≤ 0). Savings are the difference in 
compensation costs between observed contracts and optimal contracts as a percentage of total (observed) pay: (π0d – π0*)/π0d. The number of observations varies 
across different values of the multiplier M because we exclude all CEO-M-combinations for which the observed contract implies positive risk-taking incentives 
RTI from equation (13). 
 
Base Salary φ* ($m)  Stock nS*  Options nO*  Moneyness K*/P0  Savings Multipl. 
M Obs. 
Con-
verged Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median Prop=0  Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median  Mean Median
0.50 735 650 7.21 3.00 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 96.3% 2.05% 1.25% 0.77% 47.9% 48.3% 8.43% 4.59%
0.75 735 650 7.98 3.09 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 97.4% 2.14% 1.30% 0.77% 49.5% 49.9% 6.56% 3.37%
1.00 735 654 7.68 3.15 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 98.8% 2.15% 1.33% 0.46% 50.5% 50.9% 5.32% 2.56%
1.50 729 625 7.30 3.21 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 97.4% 2.13% 1.36% 0.64% 52.1% 53.0% 3.92% 1.81%
2.00 721 608 7.83 3.20 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 98.2% 2.25% 1.41% 0.49% 52.5% 53.5% 3.22% 1.43%
 
Table 6: Piecewise linear contracts when CEOs have CARA utility 
This table contains the results from repeating our analysis from Table 2 under the assumption that the CEO has CARA utility. For six different values of γ, we 
calculate the CEO’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρ as 0 0/ ( )ρ γ π= +W , where 0π is the market value of his observed compensation package and W0 is his 
initial non-firm wealth. The table displays mean and median of the four contract parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS*, option holdings nO*, and the 
moneyness, i.e. the option strike price K* scaled by the stock price P0. In addition, it shows the fraction of CEOs with non-positive salaries (φ* ≤ 0), the fraction of 
CEOs with zero stock holdings (nS* = 0), and the fraction of CEOs with non-positive option holdings (nO* ≤ 0). Savings are the difference in compensation costs 
between observed contracts and optimal contracts as a percentage of total (observed) pay: (π0d – π0*)/π0d. The number of observations varies across different 
values of γ because we exclude all CEO-γ-combinations for which the observed contract implies positive risk-taking incentives RTI from equation (13). 
 
Base Salary φ* ($m)  Stock nS*  Options nO*  Moneyness K*/P0  Savings Risk 
Aversion Obs. 
Con-
verged Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median Prop=0  Mean Median Prop≤0  Mean Median  Mean Median
0.5 626 422 5.46 2.71 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 98.1% 2.31% 1.51% 1.90% 55.1% 56.3% 0.54% 0.17%
1.0 705 572 6.61 3.15 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 98.8% 2.26% 1.40% 1.05% 55.6% 56.5% 1.15% 0.45%
2.0 733 640 6.98 3.20 0.00% 0.29% 0.00% 97.3% 2.13% 1.32% 2.03% 54.1% 55.2% 2.99% 1.34%
3.0 735 639 7.09 3.15 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 98.1% 2.04% 1.24% 1.25% 52.1% 53.1% 5.34% 2.96%
5.0 735 627 7.06 3.04 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 96.2% 1.79% 1.12% 0.80% 48.6% 49.3% 10.37% 6.92%
8.0 737 556 5.85 2.57 0.00% 0.42% 0.00% 93.4% 1.44% 0.89% 0.72% 45.3% 45.5% 18.56% 16.11%
45 
 
Table 7: Validity of the first-order approach 
This table displays for each of the three contracts (linear, monotonic, and general) and for three levels of 
risk aversion the proportion of CEOs for whom the first-order approach is certainly violated, i.e. for whom 
condition (23) is violated. This is done separately for five different assumptions (parameterized by w) 
regarding what levels of volatility are feasible. The minimum feasible volatility is given by equation (25). 
As w decreases from 1 to 0, the lower bound on volatility rises and our assumptions regarding the feasible 
levels of volatility become stronger. For the remaining CEOs (for whom condition (23) is not violated) 
there are assumptions on the cost function and the production function such that the CEOs do not deviate 
from the effort and investment choices implemented by the observed contract. 
 
Proportion with certain violation Lower bound 
on volatility 
(w) 
Contract 
type γ = 1 γ = 3 γ = 5 
linear 76.4% 82.4% 83.1% 
monotonic 54.2% 92.3% 96.4% 1.00 
general 97.0% 99.6% 95.6% 
linear 59.9% 72.5% 73.2% 
monotonic 47.4% 89.9% 95.4% 0.95 
general 97.0% 99.6% 95.6% 
linear 50.3% 60.4% 63.7% 
monotonic 39.2% 86.3% 92.7% 0.90 
general 97.0% 99.6% 95.6% 
linear 27.9% 34.6% 35.3% 
monotonic 12.1% 51.6% 63.9% 0.75 
general 97.0% 99.6% 95.6% 
linear 12.9% 8.9% 7.6% 
monotonic 4.0% 6.5% 8.4% 0.50 
general 97.0% 99.6% 95.6% 
 
